We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest games. This family of contest games relies both on relative efforts (as Tullock's proposal) and on absolute effort differences (as difference-form contests). An additional desirable feature is that the serial contest is homogeneous of degree zero in contestants' efforts. The family is characterized by a parameter representing how sensitive the outcome is to contestants' efforts. It encompasses as polar cases the (fair) lottery and the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Equilibria have a close relationship to those of the (deterministic) all-pay auction and important properties of the latter hold for the serial contest, too.
Introduction
In a contest game agents exert irreversible e¤ort to increase their probability of winning a prize. Contests have been used to analyze a variety of situations including lobbying, rent-seeking and rent-defending contests, litigation, political campaigns, military con ‡ict, patent races, arms races, sports events, promotional competition, labor market tournaments or R&D competition. Moreover, recent papers (like e.g. Alesina and Spolaore (2005) , Baron and Diermeier (2006) , Konrad (2000a and b) or Polborn and Klumpp (2006) ) have embedded simple contest games in larger models in order to capture the e¤ect of con ‡ict on other variables of interest. This paper proposes a new family of contest games to model such situations.
In a contest the probability of winning is given by a contest success function (henceforth CSF) which depends on the e¤orts of the players. A special case is the all-pay auction, in which the player exerting the highest e¤ort wins the prize with probability one. Such a contest is therefore called deterministic (or perfectly discriminating). The all-pay auction has been analyzed by Hillman and Riley (1989) , Baye et al. (1993 Baye et al. ( , 1996 or Che and Gale (1998), among others. 1 The literature has frequently studied two families of CSFs. The 'classical'speci…ca-tion was proposed by Tullock (1980) and has been further analyzed in Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992), Baye et al. (1994) or Skaperdas (1996) . In Tullock's speci…cation the probability of winning of bidder B i is given by
where b = (b 1 ; :::; b n ) is a vector of e¤ort levels of the n contestants and is a positive parameter measuring returns to scale from e¤ort. Note that if the CSF is completely insensitive to e¤ort ( = 0), the extreme case of a (fair) lottery is obtained. The opposite case of extreme sensitivity ( ! 1) yields the all-pay auction. Tullock's formulation is also known as ratio-form, since (1.1) can be rewritten so that it depends on the ratio of contestants'e¤orts. It depends, hence, on a relative criterion. Tullock's functional form has the important advantage of being homogenous of degree zero in e¤ort. Homogeneity is a realistic property that might be interpreted as saying that it does not matter whether lobbying expenditures are measured in dollars or in euros. In addition, homogeneity is a convenient analytical property which may explain the popularity of Tullock's CSF in applications. 2 The second popular contest family is called 'di¤erence-form' CSFs. It has been proposed by Hirshleifer (1989) and further studied in Skaperdas (1996) , Baik (1998) and Che and Gale (2000) . Although the precise mathematical formulation of the CSF di¤ers in these papers, the common element is that win probabilities are based on e¤ort di¤erences. For instance, Che and Gale propose the following piece-wise linear di¤erence-form for contests with two bidders 1 (b) = max min As Tullock's speci…cation, the positive scalar speci…es how deterministic the contest is, containing the polar cases of the (fair) lottery and the all-pay auction. Notice that, since (1.2) depends on the di¤erence of e¤orts, it is not homogenous and it relies on an absolute criterion. The allocation of the prize according to an absolute criterion is controversial. Che and Gale argue forcefully that it is appropriate in many contexts. Skaperdas (1996) and Hirshleifer (2000) point out that it is a strong property. Consider the following quote from Hirshleifer (p. 779):
"It might be thought a fatal objection against the di¤erence form of the CSF that a force balance of 1,000 soldiers versus 999 implies the same outcome (in terms of relative success) as 3 soldiers versus 2! That this may seem unreasonable is probably due to the exclusion of idiosyncratic and unmodelled factors that might inject a random element into the outcome. Any reasonable provision for randomness would imply a higher likelihood of the weaker side winning the 1,000:999 comparison than in the 3:2 comparison." Summarizing, it seems that an important trade-o¤ emerges. The choice of a CSF comparing absolute e¤ort levels seems to imply the vulnerability against the above criticism. Moreover, one seems to be forced to give up homogeneity. In the current paper we propose a CSF reconciling these criteria. In a nutshell, we follow Hirshleifer's suggestion to weaken the absolute criterion and do this in such a way as to obtain a homogenous CSF.
Instead of postulating that win probabilities depend on the absolute mark-up b 1 b 2 , we require that they depend on the percentage mark-up
if all players double their e¤ort, then the probabilities of winning the contest are unchanged-the increase in e¤ort is completely wasted."
of the highest bid. So we de…ne
Notice that this assignment process follows exactly Hirshleifer's suggestion. The present paper proposes the serial CSF as a generalization of the previous expression. 3 In the case of two contestants the serial contest can be de…ned as follows
A formulation for more than two contestants will be provided in Section 2. 4 Similarly to the other two families, the family of serial contest games is characterized by a economics of scale parameter that comprises the polar cases of the (fair) lottery and the all-pay auction. As the CSF becomes more sensitive to e¤ort levels, the contest becomes more deterministic until the benchmark case of the all-pay auction is reached. Notice also that the serial contest is homogeneous. The next …gure compares the three families of CSFs for 2 f1=2; 1; 10g. In the examples we …x the bid of the second contestant as b 2 = 1. 5 In the examples the piecewise linear function (red) is Che and Gale's CSF and the serial CSF (black) intersects Tullock's CSF (blue) from below. The third example shows that both the serial and Tullock's CSF can have a region with increasing marginal returns from e¤ort. It also suggests that as the all-pay auction is approached, Tullock's CSF and the serial contest behave very similarly. 3 The class of serial contests is related to three di¤erent literatures. First, it is inspired in a proposal for bankruptcy problems known as the Contested Garment Principle (see Dagan (1996) for an analysis of this bankruptcy solution). Second, there is a similarity to the Serial Cost Sharing Rule of Moulin and Shenker (1992) . Third, there exists a close relationship to the Shapley Value of appropriately de…ned cooperative games (see Littlechild and Owen (1973) for the closely related airport game). 4 Notice that for = 1, (1.4) boils down to (1.3). 5 Note that because of homogeneity this is w.l.o.g. under Tullock's and the serial CSF, but not with the di¤erence-form. Under the later contestant 1's win probability is responsive to his e¤ort when b1 2 [b2 1=(2 ); b2 + 1=(2 )]. The current paper o¤ers a strategic analysis of the serial contest. For the case of two contestants we provide characterization of equilibrium for all values of the returns to scale from e¤ort parameter and for any valuations for the prize the contestants might have. As in the Tullock rent-seeking game, pure strategy Nash equilibria exist only if the contest is not too deterministic ( 1) .
For more deterministic contests we analyze mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
Surprisingly, it turns out that the equilibrium properties of the serial contest are very robust to di¤erent amounts of non-determinacy. Broadly speaking, for a wide range of non-determinacy the equilibria are essentially the ones of the extreme case of the all-pay auction ( 1) . This includes the constant returns to scale case ( = 1) in which the equilibrium is in pure strategies: contestants bid the expectation of the mixed strategy equilibrium of the all-pay auction. Intuitively, as the contest approaches the fair lottery further ( < 1), the predictions of the serial contest di¤er more from the all-pay auction and converge to the optimal behavior in a lottery completely insensitive to e¤ort. We investigate then to what extent these results are robust to an increase in the number of contestants. As long as the CSF is not too insensitive to e¤ort, further contestants have a strict incentive not to participate in the contest. We show also that the close relationship between the serial contest and the all-pay auction extends to further equilibrium properties like rent dissipation, exclusion principle, preemption e¤ect or the consequences of a cap on individual e¤ort levels.
Summarizing, the contest proposed in the current paper has several advantages over the two previously mentioned contest families:
With respect to Tullock's formulation, we provide a CSF in which -in addition to relative e¤orts -absolute e¤ort di¤erences play a role. Whether this is appropriate depends on the context. From a more applied point of view the serial contest with two contestants allows characterization of equilibrium for all levels of sensitivity of the CSF to contestants e¤orts and for any valuations for the prize the contestants might have. Moreover, the equilibrium of the serial contest is very robust. 6 With respect to di¤erence-form contests, the serial contest o¤ers the advantages of weakening the absolute criterion in the assignment process and of being homogenous. It can also be easily de…ned for more than two contestants and we o¤er a preliminary equilibrium analysis of this case. 7 With respect to the robustness of the equilibrium 6 The Tullock rent-seeking game has the drawback that it is only well understood when the CSF is either very insensitive to e¤ort (0 n=(n 1)) or it is extremely sensitive ( ! 1). Baye et al. (1994) study the intermediate cases when two contestants have a common valuation for the prize. They characterize symmetric equilibria when the set of bids is discrete and analyze total expected rent dissipation. Concerning robustness, for the cases in which the Tullock rent-seeking game o¤ers equilibrium predictions, these predictions di¤er from the all-pay auction qualitatively (see Nitzan (1994) and the discussion in Che and Gale (2000) or Fang (2002) predictions, Che and Gale (2000) show the convergence of equilibrium to the one of the polar all-pay auction, while in the serial contest equilibria are essentially the same for a wide range of non-determinacy.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the serial contest for any number of contestants in the next section. Section 3 analysis equilibrium in the case of two contestants. The robustness to an increase in the number of contestants is investigated in Section 4; and further links to the all-pay auction are derived in Section 5. The last section o¤ers a concluding discussion.
The Serial Contest Model
Consider a contest where n > 1 agents (contestants) compete for a prize. Each contestant has a valuation for the object, denoted by V i , and submits a bid b i . The set of contestants or bidders is denoted by B = fB 1 ; : : : ; B i ; : : : ; B n g. Bidders are risk-neutral, and they bid simultaneously. The valuations are common knowledge and without loss of generality ordered such that V 1 V 2 : : :
The winner is determined through a contest success function. This function associates, to each vector of bids b, a lottery specifying for each agent a probability of getting the object. The CSFs (1.1), (1.2) and (1.4) mentioned in the Introduction are examples for De…nition 2.1. Given the contest success function and linear costs of e¤ort, agents' expected utility from participating in the contest, when the vector of bids is b, is
We de…ne now formally the class of serial contest functions for any number of contestants. In order to do this it is necessary to distinguish between non-degenerated (fb 0; b 6 = 0g) and degenerated bid vectors (all contestants bid zero). In the latter case we follow Baye et al. (1994) and establish a fair lottery for the prize. 8 Moreover, without loss of generality we suppose that the vector of bids is ordered such that b 1 b 2 ::: b n . 9 Given this order, we can rewrite equation (1.4) as follows
We are now in a position to extend the two-contestant CSF to any number of agents. It is common in the contest literature to interpret the scalar as measuring economics of scale because it indicates the marginal return from lobbying e¤orts.
Notice that the class of serial contest success functions can also be de…ned recursively as follows
for all i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; n 1g:
3. The Two-Contestants Case
Constant Returns to Scale: = 1
In this section we analyze pure strategy Nash equilibria of the serial contest in its simplest functional form. We …nd that any equilibrium has all-pay auction properties, because contestants bid the expectation of the equilibrium mixed strategy of the all-pay auction. We establish a unique equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose n = 2, V 1 V 2 and = 1. There exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the serial contest. In this equilibrium contestants' bids and expected payo¤s are as follows
while total e¤ort is
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The equilibrium has a particularly simple structure because the payo¤ function of B 2 is linear. For low b 1 it is increasing while for high b 1 it is decreasing. The equilibrium bid
's indi¤erence means that he can as well bid b 2 , which makes b 1 optimal for B 1 . Note that this indi¤erence of the weaker contestant is also a feature of the equilibrium of the all-pay auction. In the all-pay auction the weaker bidder places the atom (1 V 2 =V 1 ) at zero and randomizes continuously up to his valuation when he enters the contest. We show in Subsection 3.3 that decreasing by an arbitrary small amount makes the indi¤erence between abstaining and contesting disappear. But before doing so we close the gap between constant returns to scale and the polar case of the all-pay auction.
Increasing Returns to Scale: > 1
It is well known that in the all-pay auction there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, non-deterministic contests (like the Tullock rent-seeking game) exhibit this feature when the CSF approaches the all-pay auction and becomes sensitive enough to e¤ort. This is also true in the serial contest.
To see why there is no pure strategy equilibrium under increasing returns assume that there are only two bidders. At least one of them, say agent B 2 , must choose b 2 such that it maximizes b 2 =(2b 1 )V 2 b 2 . For > 1 this objective function is strictly convex and strictly negative for small bids. However, if b 1 is low enough then the objective function becomes positive again and thus, b 2 = b 1 . But then, given the strong concavity of the CSF, it pays for bidder B 1 to increase his bid. Proposition 3.2. Suppose > 1. There exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the serial contest.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
We turn now to mixed strategy equilibria. Such a strategy for player B i is denoted by i and the associated strategy pro…le is indicated by . The next result says that any serial contest in which the CSF is su¢ ciently sensitive to e¤ort has an equilibrium with all-pay auction properties, since contestants bid in expected terms as in the deterministic case.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose n = 2, V 1 V 2 and 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategies to the serial contest. In this equilibrium contestants'expected bids and expected payo¤s are as follows
while the expected total e¤ort is
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Decreasing Returns to Scale: < 1
As for the constant returns to scale case, we establish a unique equilibrium. To underline the 'continuous' variation of equilibria for variations of , the statement includes the one of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose n = 2, V 1 V 2 and 1. There exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the serial contest. In this equilibrium contestants' bids and expected payo¤s are as follows
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
For < 1 both payo¤ functions are strictly concave and the equilibrium is strict. When the CSF becomes insensitive to e¤ort and approaches the fair lottery, equilibrium bids go to zero. 10 
Many Contestants
In this section we investigate the robustness of the equilibrium predictions of the twobidder serial contest w.r.t an increase in the number of contestants. We …nd further similarities to the all-pay auction equilibrium when the CSF is not too insensitive to e¤ort.
An important property of the all-pay auction refers to participation in the contest. A well known result says the following. Suppose valuations are decreasingly ordered, that is, V 1 V 2 V n . There exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the two contestants with the highest valuations bid in (expectation) as in Theorems 3.1 and 3.3. All other contestants abstain from the contest with probability one. Moreover, this equilibrium is unique if V 2 > V 3 . 11 Thus, when embedding an all-pay auction into a larger game, one might argue that it is reasonable to deal only with two contestants. In this section we show that the serial contest has similar properties when the CSF is not too di¤erent from the all-pay auction. More precisely, this is true under non-decreasing returns to scale but not under decreasing returns to scale.
Constant Returns to Scale: = 1
The next result says that under constant returns to scale there is an equilibrium in pure strategies in which (loosely speaking) the prescriptions of Theorems 3.1 apply to contestants B 1 and B 2 , while all other contestants have a strict incentive to abstain from the contest with probability one. V n and = 1. There exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the serial contest. In this equilibrium contestants'bids and expected payo¤s are as follows
When there is a multiplicity of equilibria, in no equilibrium there is a contestant whose expected payo¤ exceeds the one speci…ed in the statement. Moreover, the only case in which there is no revenue equivalence among equilibria is when more than one contestant have the second highest valuation which is strictly lower than the highest one. See Baye et al. (1996) for more details.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
As the all-pay auction, the serial contest has multiple equilibria. For instance, if there are three contestants with the same valuation it is not clear who abstains. Moreover, even in situations in which valuations di¤er this multiplicity might persist. Consider the following example.
Example 4.2. Let (V 1 ; V 2 ; V 3 ) = (10; 9; 8) and = 1. The following strategy pro…le is an equilibrium. Contestant B 1 is not active and bidsb 1 = 0. Bidder B 2 bidsb 2 = 4 and B 3 exerts e¤ortb 3 = 32=9. Given the abstention of B 1 , the others act optimally (by Theorem 3.1). Givenb 2 andb 3 ,
The strategy pro…le used in this example constitutes an equilibrium because of a 'coordination failure'. The 'wrong' set of contestants is active. Given the other bids and that valuations are very close it does not pay for the bidder with the highest valuation to submit a positive bid. This equilibrium disappears if V 1 increases. Despite the multiplicity of equilibria we can establish that an important property of the all-pay auction holds for any equilibrium of the constant returns to scale serial contest.
V 2 V n and = 1. In any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the serial contest there are exactly two active bidders. If a strategy pro…le constitutes an equilibrium in which the bidder pair B i and B k with i < k is active, then the prescriptions of Theorem 3.1 apply (substituting the subscript 1 for i and 2 for k).
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
The multiplicity of equilibria in the serial contest is a natural extension of the multiplicity of equilibria in the all-pay auction (see Theorem 1 and 2 in Baye et al. (1996) ). In the latter a multiplicity arises when contestants have exactly the same valuation, while in the former a multiplicity exists when valuations are exactly or almost the same. In both contests di¤erent coordinations result in di¤erent sets of active contestants.
Increasing Returns to Scale: > 1
The next result says that we can extend the mixed strategy equilibrium in Theorem 3.3 in the same way as we did with the pure strategy equilibrium of Theorem 3.1.
V n and 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategies to the n-player serial contest. In this equilibrium contestants' expected bids and expected payo¤s are as follows
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Again, there are multiple equilibria. To see this note that for more than three contestants Theorem 4.4 establishes an asymmetric equilibrium even if the game is symmetric. Following Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), our Lemma A.1 (in the Appendix) guarantees the existence of a symmetric equilibrium even when there are more than three contestants.
Because of Theorems 4.1 and 4.4 one might argue that it is reasonable to restrict the analysis of the serial contest to the case of only two bidders. We show next that this is no longer so when the CSF is very insensitive to e¤ort.
Decreasing Returns to Scale: < 1
As in the constant returns to scale case, one might try to generalize the equilibrium of the two-bidder contest to any number of contestants. It turns out that this is a di¢ cult task and we will leave an exhaustive analysis for future research. However, it is straightforward to see that with decreasing returns to scale low valuation contestants have strong incentives not to abstain from the contest.
Taking into account that valuations are decreasingly ordered, it is natural that this order is re ‡ected in the bids of a pure strategy equilibrium. The contestants'…rst order conditions imply then that the following strategy pro…le is a candidate equilibrium
Note that for n = 2, this strategy pro…le becomes identical to the one in Theorem 3.4. 12 Notice also that b i > 0 for all B i = 2 fB 1 ; B 2 g. It turns out that in many situations 1 2 It can also be shown that the candidate equilibrium strategy pro…le converges to the one for constant returns to scale. That is, as
and b i ! 0 for all agents Bi with i > 2.
the candidate equilibrium constitutes indeed a pure strategy equilibrium to the manybidder serial contest with decreasing returns to scale. It is thus straightforward to …nd examples in which more than two contestants have an incentive to participate. 13 To summarize, there are situations in which the predictions of the many-bidder serial contest might di¤er from the two-contestant case. However, it is worth pointing out that this might happen when the CSF is very insensitive to e¤ort. These situations are the less interesting cases because the applications of contest models mentioned in the Introduction are not instances in which contestants have very limited in ‡uence in determining the winner of the contest.
Properties of Equilibrium: Further Links to the All-Pay Auction
In this section we show that -apart from the links we have already established between the serial contest and the all-pay auction -there are important further properties which both share.
The Extent of Rent Dissipation
Apart from the issue of existence of Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies, the primary concern of the rent-seeking literature has been the question how di¤erent contests a¤ect rent dissipation. As usual, assume in this subsection that all agents have the same valuation V for the political prize. The rent dissipation rate D is measured by the ratio between total rent-seeking outlays in equilibrium and the value of the contested rent.
Corollary 5.1. Assume n = 2 and V 1 = V 2 = V . In (a symmetric) equilibrium of the serial contest the extent of rent dissipation is D = minf ; 1g.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
The corollary shows that the serial contest shares with the all-pay auction the following feature: with symmetric valuations (and 1) the rent is fully dissipated, even when the number of rent-seekers is small. Moreover, this conclusion remains approximately true for further values of the economies of scale parameter . This contrasts with a well known result establishing D = 1=2 in the Tullock rent-seeking game with economics of scale parameter = 1 (see e.g. Konrad (2006)).
The Exclusion Principle
In their analysis of the all-pay auction Baye et al. (1993) have identi…ed an interesting incentive for a contest administrator that is very related to the extent of rent dissipation. They consider an administrator who is interested in maximizing the expected total amount of bids. The exclusion principle is de…ned as the precommitment to preclude contestants most valuing the prize from participating in the contest. Baye et al. (1993) show that depending on the vector of valuations the administrator may have an incentive to organize such an ine¢ cient contest. Given that our Theorems 4.1 and 4.4 establish that the expected equilibrium revenues follow equation (10) V n . For any 1, there exist valuations such that the exclusion principle applies and the politician bene…ts from excluding the contestants valuing the prize most from participating in the serial contest.
Notice that the exclusion principle does not apply to the Tullock rent-seeking game with economics of scale parameter = 1 (Fang (2002) ).
The Preemption E¤ect
Another related property of the all-pay auction is the preemption e¤ect (see Che and Gale (2000) ). This e¤ect occurs if an increase in the asymmetry of valuations of contestants causes the low valuation bidder to be more pessimistic about his prospects of winning and to become less aggressive. This allows the high valuation bidder to bid less aggressive, too. We de…ne the preemption e¤ ect as a decrease in expected total e¤ort due to a decrease in V 2 . 14 Direct computation of @ET E=@V 2 from the expressions in Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 shows that this derivative is positive and we have the following result. 1 4 We de…ne the preemption e¤ect in response to a variation in V2 in order to …t it with the preceding intuition from Che and Gale (2000) . These authors de…ne the e¤ect as a decrease in expected total e¤ort due to an increase in V1 (p. 37). For the case of the all-pay auction under both de…nitions there is preemption. However, B1 does not lower his bid on average in response to an increase in V1. Instead, his expected bid remains unchanged. To the contrary, under our de…nition both bidders bid less aggressive. For the serial contest the choice of de…nition matters. De…ning the e¤ect in response to V1 yields that for 1, there is always a preemption e¤ect. For 2 ( ], there is never a preemption e¤ect. Broadly speaking, the lower , the more moderate the asymmetry must be for the preemption e¤ect to occur. The reason for the di¤erent results under both de…nitions comes from the fact that in response to a change in V1 contestant B1 bids more aggressive while B2 reduces his e¤ort. For the preemption e¤ect to apply, the increase must be less than the reduction. In the second price all-pay auction the occurrence of a preemption e¤ect depends also on the way the asymmetry is increased (see Riley (1999) ).
Corollary 5.3. Assume n = 2 and V 1 V 2 . For any > 0, there is always a preemption e¤ect in the serial contest.
The E¤ect of a Cap on Political Lobbying
Che and Gale (1998) use the all-pay auction model to study campaign spending in a lobbying game. They analyze the e¤ect of contribution limits -modelled by a cap m on bids -on aggregate expenditures. They show that a cap on individual bids may have the perverse e¤ect of increasing expected total e¤ort. The intuition for this e¤ect is that a cap can attenuate bidder 1's ability to preempt bidder 2. As a result bidding competition may be increased and aggregate expenditures may be raised. A similar result is true in the serial contest.
Broadly speaking, given that the cap is low enough, in the equilibrium of the serial contest both contestants submit the highest possible bid. Thus, the restricted ability to preempt results in a game that admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium -even when without cap there is none (see Proposition 3.2). These strategies are not an equilibrium without a cap, because for B 1 it pays to outbid the competitor. But this deviation from the candidate equilibrium is prevented by the cap, making the strategy pro…le an equilibrium. A cap increases expected total e¤ort if valuations are asymmetric enough and, as a consequence, in the equilibrium without a cap the total e¤ort is relatively low. We obtain the following result.
Corollary 5.4. Assume n = 2 and V 1 > V 2 . For any > 0, a cap has always the potential to increase expected total e¤ort in the serial contest. Formally, this occurs if
where = if 1 and = 1 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
This contrasts with Fang's result that a cap does not increase expected total e¤ort in the Tullock rent-seeking game with economics of scale parameter = 1 (Fang (2002) ).
Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed a family of contest games in which the sensitivity of the contest success function to the contestants' e¤orts is parameterized by a economics of scale parameter . It contains the polar cases of the (fair) lottery and the (deterministic) all-pay auction in which = 0 and ! 1, respectively. Our model has advantages over previous work on contests.
First, although win probabilities depend on e¤ort di¤erences, we weaken this absolute criterion. In the serial contest win probabilities depend on percentage mark-ups of e¤ort. Moreover, the serial contest is homogenous of degree zero in e¤ort.
Second, in applications, two-player contests are often plugged into larger models in order to analyze the e¤ect of con ‡ict situations on other variables of interest. In such a situation the game is solved by backwards induction and the equilibrium payo¤s of the contest subgame are plugged into the previous stage. The serial contest o¤ers a very tractable model for this purpose. We have shown that given contestants'valuations V 1 and V 2 , with V 1 V 2 , equilibrium payo¤s are given by
where = if 1 and = 1 otherwise. 15 Thus, the model builder does not need to deal with the speci…c algebraic form of the equilibrium strategies. These expressions apply to the polar case of the all-pay auction and …nite values for can be interpreted as departures from this polar case through a contest success function less and less sensitive to e¤ort. The model builder can thus easily check for robustness, that is, up to which value for the conclusions of the polar all-pay auction remain true. Further advantages are that this equilibrium is unique in many situations and that often further contestants have a strict incentive not to participate in the contest.
Third, in their analysis of the (two-player) di¤erence-form contest, Che and Gale (2000) provide important robustness results for the all-pay auction in the sense that the equilibrium converges to that of the all-pay auction. In contrast, this paper provides robustness results for the all-pay auction because equilibria (with any number of contestants) are essentially the same over a large parameter region.
While our model is a step toward a general theory of contests, more work is needed. On one hand, there are open questions within the class of serial contests. First, for increasing returns to scale, we do not o¤er an explicit derivation of the equilibrium mixed-strategies and it is important to determine the properties of other equilibria when they exist. Second, our analysis of the many player contest for decreasing returns to scale is incomplete and it is important to know what the equilibrium is. On the other hand, given that the serial contest shares important properties of equilibrium with other contests, it is important to know whether these properties extend to more general classes of contests.
[28] Tullock, Gordon (1980). E¢ cient rent seeking. In J. Buchanan, R. Tollison, and G.
Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rentseeking society. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 97-112.
A. Appendix A.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1
We show …rst that the pro…le b is an equilibrium. Suppose B 2 bids b 2 . We have that
Note that b 1 maximizes this function. Suppose
Straightforward computations yield E (b ) and T E(b ).
Q:E:D:
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3.2
Suppose b is a pure strategy equilibrium. Analogously to the reasoning in step 1 of the proof of Theorem 4.3 it can be established that the cardinality of the set of active bidders jB A j 2. W.l.o.g. number these contestants such that
. Given that the …rst term is negative, it is needed that the second is positive. Given > 1, the latter inequality implies that
Thus,
k for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg. Consider the active bidder with the highest valuation, say, B j . If
Given > 1 and that V j is the highest valuation, the latter holds and B j has a pro…table deviation.
Q:E:D:
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3.3
The proof we o¤er is constructive and uses three lemmata. In a …rst step, we use a …nite approximation to establish the existence of a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for any symmetric serial contest and to derive some properties of it. We go then a step further and build on this equilibrium to obtain one in asymmetric contests. 16 We start by normalizing valuations such that (V 1 ;V 2 ) = (1; V 2 =V 1 ). Since the serial contest is homogenous of degree zero in e¤ort, this is w.l.o.g., because it does not change the ranking of payo¤s from pure strategies. If a pure strategy b 1 =V 1 yields
2 )V 1 in the original game because win probabilities are the same. Consider …rst the symmetric serial contest in which there is a common valuation V = 1. We consider in addition to the original game a discrete version of the serial contest. The serial contest is …nite with grid G if the strategy space is discrete such that given some integer G only bids on the …nite grid f0; 1=G; 2=G; : : : ; (G 1)=G; 1g are feasible. We indicate an arbitrary element of the grid by x=G where x 2 f0; 1; : : : ; Gg. 17 
Let~
G denote an equilibrium to the game with …nite grid G. The …rst lemma is a direct consequence of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . It establishes existence of equilibrium and relates the continuous to the …nite game. For later reference it refers to any number of contestants. 18 Lemma A.1. The symmetric n-bidder serial contest has a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, both when the strategy space is …nite and when it is continuous. Moreover, the pro…le = lim G!1~ G exists and constitutes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium to the continuous serial contest.
Proof. The existence of a symmetric equilibrium for the serial contest with …nite grid G follows from Lemma 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . We will show that the conditions of their Theorem 6 are also satis…ed. This theorem guarantees the existence of a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium when the strategy space is continuous. In addition, the proof of Dasgupta and Maskin's Theorem 6 shows that the limiting equilibrium of a …nite approximation to the strategy space as the grid size goes to zero is indeed an equilibrium to the continuous game. The application of their theorem requires …ve conditions to be ful…lled. First, the sum of payo¤s must be upper semi-continuous.
1] and i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. Third, the discontinuities in the individual payo¤ functions must be of dimension less than n. This holds because for the serial contest the origin is the only point of discontinuity. Fourth, a so-called property must hold. Because of the single discontinuity this inequality is straightforward to check. Fifth, the individual payo¤ functions E i (b i ; b i ) must be weakly lower semi-continuous in b i . This is ful…lled as they are lower semi-continuous. Thus, Theorem 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) can be applied.
We return now to two-bidder serial contest with …nite grid G.
Lemma A.2. Suppose 1. In any symmetric Nash equilibrium~
2 ) of a symmetric two-bidder serial contest with …nite grid G it is true that
Proof. First of all, let us introduce some additional notation. Given G, and contestant
ik denotes the probability that contestant B i assigns to bidding k=G. Note that in a symmetric equilibrium no mass will be placed at 1, that is,~ G iG = 0 for i = 1; 2. To proof Lemma A.2, we will concentrate on agent B 1 . A similar reasoning applies to agent B 2 .
(1) (a) For the lower bound: The expected payo¤ from bidding x when the opponent follows the equilibrium strategy~
For the upper bound: Given that~ G is an equilibrium, B 1 must react optimally to B 2 's strategy. Hence, the following holds for all x:
Let x 0 be the lowest bid that is part of the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. 19 By (ii) condition (A.2) holds with equality
3) and substitution in inequality (A.4) yields 1 2
Note that every term on the left hand side of condition (A.5) is non-negative. To see this, de…ne = 
(2) We have that in a symmetric equilibrium
Summing up for both agents gives
and rearranging yields the statement. 1 9 I.e.,~
Lemma A.3. Suppose
1.
If is a symmetric (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium strategy pro…le of a symmetric two-bidder serial contest, then the following bidding strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium to the asymmetric two-bidder serial contest withV 1 >V 2 :
Contestant B 1 bids 1 = 1 and contestant's B 2 's strategy 2 is such that he abstains from the contest with probability (1 V 2 =V 1 ) and bids 2 whenever he participates.
Proof. To see that B 2 has no pro…table deviation from 2 , note that in the symmetric game B 2 obtains an expected payo¤ of E 2 ( ) = 0. Since 1 = 1 andV 2 is the same in both games, any pure strategy yields the same as in the symmetric game, B 2 obtains E 2 ( ) = 0 and is willing to abstain with probability (1 V 2 =V 1 ). For B 1 note that in the symmetric game, given the mixed strategy 2 by B 2 , all pure strategies b 1 in the support of 1 maximize
where E[PrfB 1 winsjb 1 ; 1 ; g] is B 1 's expected win probability from the pure strategy b 1 when the CSF is 1 and B 2 mixes according to the equilibrium strategy . Note that, although we do not know whether is a continuous, discrete, or partially continuous and discrete distribution, the following must be true. WhenV 1 >V 2 , since 2 = 2 (conditional on entry), we look for pure strategies that maximize
Given that any pure strategy in the support of 1 maximizes (A.6) and that (A.6) and (A.7) only di¤er by an additive constant, any pure strategy in the support of 1 maximizes (A.7), too. For later reference observe that a pure strategy maximizing (A.6) yields E 2 ( ) = 0, while with (A.7) E 1 ( ) =V 1 V 2 is obtained. suggest that, as the returns to scale increase, the bulk of probability mass shifts to the right and some mass is attached to low bids. As increases further, becomes more and more uniformly distributed, which is the optimal bidding strategy in the all-pay auction. 20 
A.4. Proof of Theorem 3.4
For = 1, the statement follows from Theorem 3.1. Suppose < 1. Given two bids
We show …rst that the pro…le b is an equilibrium. Suppose B 2 bids b 2 . We have that if b 1 b 2 , then the optimal choice must solve [P H ] and we obtainb
1 . This means that B 1 has an incentive to raise his bid until equalling the one of B 2 , becauseb L (b 2 ) b 2 if and only
1 which is true. Suppose B 1 bids b 1 . We have that if b 2 b 1 , then the 2 0 Due to the …niteness, contestants obtain very low but strictly positive expected pro…ts (smaller than 0:039). Moreover, the expected bid -even of the constant returns to scale case and the discrete all-pay auction -is strictly lower than 0:5 (but larger than 0:46). Baye et all (1994) have shown that in the two-player case the symmetric equilibrium of the discrete all-pay auction converges to the unique equilibrium of the continuous strategy space all-pay auction. . This implies E i (b ) < 0.
Step 3: jB A j 2. Let n = 2, V 1 > V 2 and m be in the range speci…ed by (5.1). Notice that the upper bound implies that, whatever the value of , the cap restricts at least B 1 's optimal bid. We show …rst that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which both contestants bid m. Suppose contestant B i bids b i = m. We have that for B j 6 = B i , E j (b j ; m) = V j =2, E j (b j ; m) is strictly increasing. Thus, b i = m is optimal. Consider < 1. E j (b j ; m) is a strictly concave function. Moreover, it is strictly increasing at b j = m if and only if
